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## STUDY PROJECT

### INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THREATS AND HOW TO COMBAT IT

BY

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International Terrorism Threats  
and How to Combat It

An Individual Study Project

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International terrorism has thrived on an atmosphere of weakness and disunity of the West. Terrorists and their supporters, sponsoring states, view the Western countries as uniquely vulnerable to their attacks. They know that the openness of Western societies affords them many possibilities for attack, and they assume that the West's humaneness and its emphasis on rule of law will inhibit a powerful response.

This study provides main features of international terrorism in the last decade, a description of the major role of state-sponsored terrorism and the failure of Western nations to respond. Finally, the study concludes with set of recommendations to counterterrorism more efficiently.

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

International terrorism is a phenomenon which although it cannot threaten the survival of states, can disrupt their national, political, economic and social processes. It is a threat that both governments and the private sector cannot take lightly.

Since 1980, more than 7,500 terrorist incidents have occurred worldwide leaving nearly 5,000 people dead and 12,000 wounded. During 1989 more than 50 terrorist groups were involved in international terrorist activities against citizens and property in a total of 60 out of 74 countries.<sup>1</sup>

This study provide descriptions of the features of international terrorism, its threats to the democratic states, and finally discusses the question whether we can win against terrorism.

In this study, terrorism is defined as:

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 'International terrorism' is terrorism involving the citizens or territory of more than one country.<sup>2</sup>

The threat which international terrorism presents is considerable. It has proved this again and again by attracting publicity, disrupting governments and businesses, and in causing significant death and destruction. Modern military technology

provides much greater fire power and much greater efficiency to terrorists. We may have to be less optimistic for the future because opportunities will open up to terrorist groups which do not exist today. Super violence in the form of certain chemicals, bacteriological agents and even nuclear devices will be available to terrorists.<sup>3</sup>

Because terrorism is a media event, terrorists make a conscious and deliberate effort to manipulate the media for their own interests. A soldier shot in the back in Belfast may merit a few lines in the national papers, and probably none in the international press, but a supermarket bombed in a city center with women and children killed or an airliner hijacked will get headlines and prime time treatment. For that reason, freedom of the press, international terrorism can flourish in the democratic West.<sup>4</sup>

The threat of international terrorism is further complicated by the existence of state-sponsored terrorism. The working definition in this study for state-sponsored terrorism is:

The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.<sup>5</sup>

Sponsoring states give terrorists money, safe haven, logistical help, training and weapons, secure rear areas,

diplomatic support, and protection against retaliation. The ability to obtain genuine passports, to ship arms and explosives via official diplomatic pouches, and to enjoy lavish financing allows terrorists to operate more often and in a more deadly manner.

States that sponsor terrorism have found that it is often safer and easier to achieve their political goals by backing and using terrorist groups than to be involved in a conventional war.

In practice, the response of the Western World has been mainly passive--defensive and reactive, rather than offensive. Responses of states to terrorism are often influenced by diplomatic, economic and political factors.<sup>6</sup> Hence, we are witnessing from time to time that states offer concessions to terrorists instead of putting pressure on them.

The question we should ask is whether we have the competence to counter terrorism better than we are doing, or will the terrorist subculture become a permanent fixture in our world?



## ENDNOTES

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## Chapter 2

### Main Features of International Terrorism

#### Basic data

The preferred tactics used by terrorists are bombing, arson and armed assault. During recent years these three tactics accounted for about 85 percent of all international terrorist incidents worldwide.<sup>1</sup>

Bombing has been the most common terrorist tactic, totalling about 50 percent of all international incidents, because it is the simplest and least risky method to the terrorist of conveying his message. In addition, when used in a sophisticated operation, bombing may prove to be a most destructive tactic in terms of human lives and political ramifications. Thus 1987 witnessed the explosion of a South Korean airliner over the Thai-Burmese border on November 29, causing the death of 155 passengers and crew, and an Afghani-directed campaign of bombing attacks in Pakistan that resulted in the killing of over a hundred people.<sup>2</sup>

Preferred targets for bombs are economic targets, business, governmental facilities and personnel. An example of a business facility may be the bombs exploded on 27 October 1990 at two separate offices of the Spanish Embassy in the Hague, Netherlands by the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Another example of assassination used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the

murder of the West German wife of a British soldier in Dortmund, on 7 September 1990.<sup>3</sup>

Terrorists hit noncombatant military targets. Examples would include the assassination of U.S. defense attache Capt. William Nordeen in Athens in June 1988, the bombing outside a U.S. Air Force communications facility in Spain in April 1988 and the killing of four off-duty U.S. Marine guards at an outdoor cafe in San Salvador in June 1985.<sup>4</sup>

Other terrorist tactics are hijackings, barricade-hostage taking, and kidnappings. While such activities represent only a small portion of all terrorist activity, they are among the most spectacular types of event and, being attractive to the media, tend to be relatively sensational in terms of public and political impact.

In recent years, Lebanon became the main arena of kidnapping and abduction of foreign citizens. From 1982 until August 1988 the number of foreigners abducted in Lebanon reached approximately 40 percent of the total number of foreigners kidnapped in the world.<sup>5</sup> The perpetrators are mainly Shi'ite groups with their sponsoring states which are in an ongoing conflict with the Western states.

The broad picture of the foreign hostages in Lebanon reflects the international feature of this tactic and the complex

and prolonged political challenge that the Western countries have to face. As of early May 1989, 18 foreign nationals were being held hostage in Lebanon. At least 12 of them had been kidnapped by Hizballah: nine Americans, a British citizen, a Belgian national and an Iraqi. Fath Revolutionary Council (FRC) was also believed to be holding two British citizens. Additional foreigners--an Italian, an Irishman, an Iraqi and an Iranian national--were believed to be held by other Lebanese military elements.<sup>6</sup>

Geographic distribution shows that the preferred arena for international terrorist activity during the last ten years has been the Middle East, in the second place is Western Europe, and Latin America in the third place.<sup>7</sup>

There are more than fifty active terrorist organizations which are involved in international terrorist activity. Of these about ten groups play the main role in this arena. In 1988, the major perpetrating groups were: Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) pro-Cuban group; the ETA; Hizballah, a Shi'ite group sponsored by Iran; Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC); PLO'S factions, Sendero Luminozo (SL), in Peru; New People's Army (NPA), in the Philippines; and the IRA in Ireland. This distribution of major terrorist groups emphasizes how the international terrorism covers the globe.<sup>8</sup>

### Cooperation Between the Terrorist Organizations

There is evidence of cooperation among international terrorist organizations in the form of common training, financial and technical support. Documents captured during Israel's action in Lebanon in 1982 showed that terrorists from West Germany, Italy, Northern Ireland, Spain, Holland, France, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Japan, Argentina, East Timor, Eritrea, the United States, Chile, and southern Africa visited PLO camps in Lebanon. These foreign terrorists were trained in several centers there. Basque, German, and Italian terrorists were trained in Shatilla refugee camp. Over one hundred Spanish terrorists were trained at Burg al-Barajneh in Beirut in 1979. The Turkish Gray Wolves are believed to be the first foreign terrorist group to go to the PLO in Lebanon for training. Several of its members were found in the Palestinian camp of Tal al-Za'tar in the 1960s, where they were later joined by Cubans, Somalians, and Pakistanis.<sup>9</sup>

A classic illustration of this cooperation among terrorists groups is shown by the route of the three Japanese United Red Army (JRA) gun men who committed the mass murders at Tel Aviv's Lod airport in May 1972. The three first flew to the United States and Canada, then on to Paris, at the time Paris was a base of operations for their comrades in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). From France they traveled to Lebanon, where they received commando training at a Fedayeen camp. They then returned to their friends in Paris, where they remained until false passports could be obtained from Frankfurt.

Then they traveled to Rome, where Italian terrorists supplied them with grenades and automatic weapons made in Czechoslovakia. A German sympathizer allowed them to store these weapons in his Rome apartment until they flew to Tel Aviv to complete their mission.<sup>10</sup> By the way, JRA member Kozo Okamoto who had been jailed in Israel since his participation in the operation was released in 1985 as part of a deal freeing three PFLP-held Israeli soldiers.

The eight Palestinian guerrillas from the Black September group who seized the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum in March 1973 held three Western and two Arab diplomats as hostages. They demanded the release of jailed Baader-Meinhof terrorists from West Germany, convicted killer Sirhan Sirhan from the United States, all imprisoned Arab guerrillas from Israel, and seventeen terrorists from Jordan. When the target governments refused, the terrorists killed the three Western diplomats.<sup>11</sup>

The exchange of personnel in domestic and foreign terrorist operations has also been well documented.<sup>12</sup> During a 1970 Palestinian attempt to capture an Israeli airliner in London, Israeli security agents killed a Nicaraguan terrorist carrying three passports, including an American one. A captured member of the Turkish People's Liberation Army informed the Israelis that the killing, in May 1971, of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul was in payment for a debt owed by the group to the PLO.

The PFLP is believed to run a workshop that is the central supply system for false passports and other documents used by terrorists around the world. Examination of numerous captured documents confirms that they originate from a single source. Palestinians, West Germans, Japanese, and the terrorist, Carlos himself, have all traveled on these false papers.<sup>13</sup>

There was also a close relationship between Palestinian groups in the Middle East and groups in Latin America. During 1982, Palestinian pilots were in Nicaragua, and Sandinistas have trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Weapons were supplied by the PLO to the Sandinistas and the People's Revolutionary Army of El Salvador as well.<sup>14</sup>

There is evidence of other alliances without ties to Palestinian groups. There is a close association between the IRA and the Breton and Basque separatists, and a well-organized cooperation between terrorist groups in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua. In mid-October of 1977, the Times of London reported that these groups set up a headquarters in Paris that has become a kind of clearinghouse for international terrorism.<sup>15</sup>

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## Chapter 3

### State-Sponsored Terror. 1

#### The Phenomenon

Terrorist organizations are not alone in fostering international terrorism. A number of states mainly in the Middle East have adopted terror as a principal method of warfare.

As General Karl von Clausewitz said long ago, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means," in other words, "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."<sup>1</sup>

State-sponsored terrorism is precisely such a pursuit of policy. Because of fears of military escalation to conventional war, terrorism can be another tool for states to use to achieve political goals.

A dramatic example of this reality is the bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut. The Department of Defense commission investigating the incident concluded:

The systematic, carefully orchestrated terrorism which we see in the Middle East represents a new dimension of warfare. These international terrorists, unlike their traditional counterparts, are not seeking to make a random political statement or to commit the occasional act of intimidation on behalf of some ill-defined long-term vision of the future. For them, terrorism is an integrated part of a strategy in which there are well-defined political and military objectives.<sup>2</sup>

Terrorism is a natural weapon of dictatorships that can keep their involvement relatively secret, are not constrained by public opinion and are sufficiently ruthless. They attack their enemies but confine their violence to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, well away from the high-intensity of open, organized military hostilities.

Algeria backs the Polisario movement against Morocco. Libya used terrorists against Egypt; the Arabs back Palestinian terrorists against Israel; Jordan for a time helped the Moslem Brotherhood against Syria; radical Syria and monarchist (later Islamic) Iran aided the Kurds against Iraq; and Syria stood behind Armenian and Kurdish groups against Turkey. Most leftist terrorist organizations operating in Latin America and even in Europe maintain facilities in Cuba and Nicaragua, and so on.<sup>3</sup>

The number of terrorist incidents that could be attributed to state sponsorship illustrates the gravity of the phenomenon. During the years 1987-1988, 366 terrorist activities out of a total of 1,300 were carried out by state sponsorship.<sup>4</sup> This number does not account for terrorist activities which were carried out with assistance of state sponsors, e.g., supply of funding and armament, and permitting use of national territory and assets for training and intelligence. The ability of state sponsors to effectively mask their involvement makes it harder to figure out their real involvement in terrorist activities.

Some Middle Eastern states use international terrorism as a major part of their strategy. Syrian-sponsored terrorism is directed against the United States, Israel, Western Europe, Arab countries not aligned with Syria, and Syrian groups opposed to the present regime. Syria's terrorism is carried out by Palestinian Arab terrorist organizations, and its own intelligence apparatus with agents in Syrian embassies worldwide. But Syria has also recruited the services of non-Arab terrorist organizations, such as the Armenian Liberation Organization, the Japanese Red Army, and the Patani Liberation Organization of Thailand, all of whose representatives sit permanently in Damascus.<sup>5</sup>

Some of the better-known acts of Syrian-backed terror include the Shi'ite bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983, and the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and the French headquarters in Beirut. Syria used terrorism to warn Jordan's King Hussein not to make any independent political moves; in 1983 it ordered the Abu Nidal faction to carry out a series of attacks on Jordanian government facilities in Amman.<sup>6</sup>

Libya, under Qaddafi has supported most of the terrorist groups throughout the world. Libya has served as a haven for many international terrorists. Murderers and airplane hijackers have been received in Libya as heroes. There are believed to be more than twenty Libyan training camps for terrorists of various

nationalities (factions of the PLO, various African organizations such as SWAPO and Polisario, the IRA and the Red Brigades, to name a few). Libyan embassies transfer arms and provide documents and diplomatic cover for terrorists.<sup>7</sup>

Iran first employed terrorism spectacularly if non-lethally, by holding American diplomats hostage in 1979 and 1980. Later on, Tehran's agents developed a network in Lebanon to encourage the Shi'ites there to spread the Islamic revolution of Khomeini. In September 1980, an Iranian-sponsored group fired rocket grenades at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. In December 1981, the Iraqi embassy in Beirut was bombed as part of Iran's war effort against Baghdad. Thirty people including the ambassador died. The Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad organization bombed the French embassy in Beirut in May 1982, even though Lebanese Shi'ites had no particular quarrel with France. France was being punished for selling arms to Iraq, Iran's enemy. The U.S. Embassy was attacked in April 1983 as the Great Satan's local headquarters from which plots were launched to oppose Iran and an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and to support the Lebanese government. Iranian-trained and financed groups used suicide bombers with devastating effect against the U.S. Marine and French camps in Beirut in October 1983 and the Israeli headquarters in Tyre in November 1983.

On the Gulf front, Iran used terrorism to extend its war against Iraq and to strike at neutrals helping it. Kuwait gave vital transport and financial help to Baghdad. On December 11,

1983, Iranian-based Islamic Jihad terrorists used truck-bombs or explosives triggered by remote control at the U.S. Embassy, a foreign residential complex, the airport, and industrial park, and a power station in Kuwait city.<sup>8</sup> The Iranians never used their own nationals but rather employed Lebanese, Iraqi, and Kuwaiti Shi'ites to cloak their involvement.

Iraq also adopted terrorism as a principal method of warfare. Iraq's intelligence services provided decisive assistance to the Abu Nidal faction which in June 1982 attempted to murder the Israeli Ambassador to London. They supplied the weapons, documents, and apparently also planning for the attempted murders. Iraq, however, did not confine its support to terrorists to the Abu Nidal group. We know with certainty that in 1979 it provided training facilities for extremist leftist groups from Europe. The need to turn to the West for weapons and credits as a result of its war with Iran has forced Iraq to abandon terrorist activities in the West for a while.<sup>9</sup>

But when the crisis in the Persian Gulf broke out, we have witnessed how great the relationship is between Iraq and extremist Palestinian terrorists. A conference of Arab radicals in Amman headed by senior PLO leaders declared, "to strike against American interests everywhere and by all means at the same moment" if the United States attacks Iraq. This conference was attended delegates from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco.<sup>10</sup>

### Soviet Union Involvement

The Soviet Union has used terrorism directly or indirectly as a strategy during the recent decades to promote its interests all over the world.

In this context, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, and Vietnam act as Soviet surrogates in exporting violence. The support provided by these countries to various Communist and non-Communist terrorist movements in both developed and developing nations is generally attributed to the decisionmakers in the Kremlin.<sup>11</sup>

PLO leaders have publicly acknowledged that thousands of fedayeen have been trained in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has given PLO operatives special diplomatic status allowing them easy movement throughout Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup>

The PLO has also served as a transmission belt for the export of KGB terrorist techniques to other regions and hence constitutes an essential element in Soviet regional and global strategy. The PLO assisted in transmitting doctrines and skills to promote destabilization campaigns by terrorist groups in Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa.<sup>13</sup>

The Czechoslovakian defector, General Jan Sejna, said that he was personally involved in a training program for foreign

terrorists in Czechoslovakia under the direct control of Soviet Military Intelligence.<sup>14</sup>

There are, to be sure, situations in which two or more governments have been involved in a terrorist operation. This situation derives from the nature of the international terrorist network, involving links between many governments. An outstanding example of the Soviet Union using this kind of method is its attempted murder of the Pope in Rome. The Soviets assigned the task to Bulgaria which in turn commissioned the Turkish Mafia, sponsored and directed by the Bulgarian security service.<sup>15</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. Ray S. Cline, Yonah Alexander, p. 47.
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Chapter 4  
International Terrorism - Failure of  
Western Nations to Respond

Uncooperative Attitude

Terrorists have been amazingly successful in gaining publicity through the media, in confusing political leaders and in creating an uncooperative attitude among the states that are victims of international terrorism. It seems that often diplomatic, economic and political factors play important roles in responding to terrorists and state-sponsored terrorism.

The Achille Lauro incident reflects this problem. On October 7, 1985, four Palestinian gunmen seized the Italian cruise ship off Egypt's coast and took hostage its crew and passengers. The terrorists, who were members of the Abu Abbas faction, a PLO faction, shot an American citizen and threw his body overboard. The terrorists were caught by the Egyptians, but were released and flew out of Egypt with their leader Abu Abbas on an Egyptian military transport. U.S. Navy fighter planes intercepted the Egyptian plane and forced it to land in Sicily. There the terrorists were seized by Italian authorities, but the Italians, however, who wanted no political conflict with Arafat, ignored a U.S. request to arrest Abu Abbas. The Americans were not permitted to even question him. He was permitted to exit Italy.<sup>1</sup>

France, highly prizing its reputation as a land of refuge, and eager to avoid terrorism on its own soil, has been willing to make the same concessions as the Italians. In 1977, it refused to hold Palestinian terrorist leader Abu Daoud for extradition and allowed terrorists to move and function freely as long as they did not operate violently on its territory.<sup>2</sup> France did not permit U.S. fighter planes to fly across France on their way to bomb targets in Libya in 1986.

In April 1984, Libyans fired from their embassy in London at a peaceful demonstration of Libyan exiles, and killed a British policewoman and wounded eleven exiles. Because of Libyan pressure, the suspects were allowed to leave the country. Britain which had terminated its relationship with Libya, reopened it only one year later.<sup>3</sup>

#### Concessions to Terrorists

Hostage-taking reflects the incompetence of Western countries to respond. The basic alternative policies considered by the countries confronted with this problem were either to negotiate a deal with the kidnappers directly or through mediators, or to use military force in order to coerce the release of the hostages. The military option, however, is complex because hostages are not concentrated in a single place, are often transferred from one place to another, and sometimes are hidden in densely populated areas. Furthermore, the strategic implication of a military intervention in the case of

Lebanon involves the interests of additional states in the region such as Syria and Iran. For that reason, victim states as U.S., West Germany, France and other have used negotiations to obtain the release of hostages through such state sponsors of terrorism as Syria, Iran and Algeria.<sup>4</sup>

#### PLO - Mandate for Terror

We may consider the successful story of the PLO in the U.N. as an absolute concession by the U.N. to a central force in international terrorism. On November 12, 1974, Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO became the only nongovernmental leader, aside from the Pope who had the opportunity to address the General Assembly of the U.N.<sup>5</sup> Since that year, the PLO has been granted permanent observer status in almost every U.N. forum.

Petropower is a motivating factor in European diplomatic activity to support the PLO. A document captured by the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon in June 1982, records a discussion in Moscow on November 13, 1979 between Yasser Arafat and then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in which the PLO Chairman affirmed that the PLO's "activity in Europe is based on Europe's need for Arab oil." Equally important is Europe's need for Arab markets.<sup>6</sup>

Take, for example, Japan, a state remote from the Middle East. Japan was reported to have recognized the PLO and permitted the visit of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in October

1981, ostensibly at the invitation of the Parliamentary League for Japan-Palestine Friendship, mainly because the Saudis wanted it done. Saudi Arabia was the principal source of Japan's oil, and dozens of Japanese companies had billions of dollars in contracts with Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the Japanese were willing to overlook the PFLP alliance with the Japanese Red Army terrorists.<sup>7</sup>

The Saudis, meanwhile, were also commending the PLO to the countries of Western Europe. A West German diplomat remarked to a correspondent of Time magazine; "When the Saudis quietly suggest that it makes sense to talk to the PLO you just don't dismiss it out of hand."<sup>8</sup>

In the 16 years since the U.N. received the PLO, the PLO's constituent organizations have been involved in more than 350 terrorist attacks. Not a single representative of a U.N. member states, however, called upon the PLO to live up to its solemn commitment of 1974 to stop terror.<sup>9</sup>

The U.S. initiated a dialogue with the PLO in December 1988, based on Yasser Arafat's renunciation of terror, but had to stop it a year later because subsequent events and PLO statements clearly showed that the PLO had violated the commitments it had made.

The acceptance, however, of the PLO as a permanent observer to the U.N. is a new phenomenon in the politics of terrorism. The threat is that terror combined with diplomacy is even more effective than terror alone.

## ENDNOTES

1. Barry Rubin, pp. 46-47.
2. Ibid., p. 31.
3. Ibid., p. 59.
4. Ariel Merary, Anat Kura, pp. 45-46.
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## Chapter 5

### Conclusions and Recommendations

The main conclusions we may derive from this examination of terrorism are that international terrorism persists, and that it focuses mainly on the democratic countries that are incapable of responding efficiently with counterterrorism.

If we look for the center of gravity of international terrorism, I would suggest that we consider the state-sponsorship of international terrorism as its center of gravity. We cannot separate the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism from international terrorism. Terrorist organizations would not have gotten very far had they not been actively supported and sustained by certain states. These states have not only supplied terrorists with the means to commit their crimes; they have also provided them with the all-important and indispensable assistance of safe passage and sanctuary. For the distinguishing feature of international terrorism is the perpetration of terrorist attacks across national frontiers. The terrorists must be launched from somewhere and they must go somewhere after their crimes. Without the collusion or acquiescence of all these states, terrorists would have been caught and brought to trial.

If we look for the Achilles Heel of the democratic countries, which are the main victims of the international terrorism, I would suggest that we consider their lack of

cooperation with each other to face the challenge because of political considerations, and also their readiness to make concessions to terrorist groups and sponsor states as well.

Hence, in the root of the problem, the sponsorship of international terrorism, we may find the key to its solution. The very reason state-sponsored terrorism relies on terrorists is to be able to wage war without the risks that war entails. As long as they are successful in denying involvement, they will easily escape retaliation. But once their support of terrorism is revealed, the rules of the game must change immediately.

First, there are political pressures that can be implemented. These could range from international condemnation to cutting off diplomatic relations as the United States and Britain did in the case of Libya. The second broad area which can work against state-sponsored terrorism is economic pressure. Most of these countries desperately need Western goods, weapons, technology, or credit. The purchasing power of the democracies is enormous, and this kind of pressure can cause state-sponsored terrorism to rethink some of their activities. The third area of response is military action. Here is the problem of protecting civil liberties but the experiences of Britain, West Germany, Israel, Italy and the United States show that it is perfectly possible to combat terrorism effectively without any significant infringements of an individual's rights.



There is no way to completely end the phenomenon of the international terrorism; it can only be ameliorated, not eliminated. In our case, more cooperation between democratic countries, applying diplomatic, economic, and military pressure together, to hurt terrorist groups and their supported can reduce the number and effectiveness of terrorist attacks.

An important factor which may facilitate the process of cooperation in counterterrorism is Gorbachev's new thinking which contains a new USSR attitude toward terrorism. It was summed up in Shevardnadze's comments to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1989:<sup>2</sup>

Violence on national, ethnic or religious grounds must no longer be tolerated....No support or sympathy should be extended to the so-called movements that allow actions humiliating other nations, or use terrorist, barbaric and inhuman methods in waging their struggle.

Here the democratic countries have a reasonable likelihood to cooperate in the future with the Soviet Union which until now had used terrorism as part of its overall strategy to achieve its political goals.

Anyway, if the Western countries want to win the struggle with the terrorism and to reduce it as much as possible, they must be unified and to adopt a policy of firmness against individual terrorists and sponsor states as well. An effective strategy to combat international terrorism can be the U.S. approach:<sup>3</sup>

- Offer no concessions to terrorists and do not ask or pressure other governments to do so.
- Bring pressure on states that support terrorism.
- Pursue international cooperation in counterterrorism, and
- Develop practical measures designed to identify, track, apprehend, prosecute and punish terrorists.

If we do not want the terrorist subculture to become a permanent fixture in our world, we must start to implement this kind of strategy.

# ENDNOTES

1. Benjamin Netanyahu, p. 215.
2. Galia Golan, Gorbachev's "New Thinking" on Terrorism, 1990, p. 89.
3. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 26.

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